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Abstract
We review studies of the impact of credit constraints on the accumulation of human
capital. Evidence suggests that credit constraints have recently become important for
schooling and other aspects of households’ behavior. We highlight the importance
of early childhood investments, since their response largely determines the impact
of credit constraints on the overall lifetime acquisition of human capital. We also
review the intergenerational literature and examine the macroeconomic impacts of
credit constraints on social mobility and the income distribution.
A common limitation across all areas of the human capital literature is the impo-
sition of ad hoc constraints on credit. We propose a more careful treatment of the
structure of government student loan programs and the incentive problems underlying
private credit. We show that endogenizing constraints on credit for human capital
helps explain observed borrowing, schooling, and default patterns and offers new in-
sights about the design of government policy.
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1 Introduction
Education and other human capital investments are central to both individual and economy-
wide development. By limiting the incentives and capacity to invest in human capital, credit
constraints play an important role in determining social mobility, the distribution of income,
and economic growth and development (Becker 1975). This article reviews recent research
in both the micro and macro literatures on human capital investment and credit constraints.
In Section 2, we use a two-period model to examine frequently tested implications of con-
straints for schooling. U.S.-based evidence on the impacts of credit constraints on college-
going, as well as consumption and work during college, is reviewed in Section 3. Evidence
suggests that the increases in college costs and returns over the last two decades have in-
creasingly pushed more youth up against their credit limits.
Recent U.S. studies suggest that borrowing constraints may be more harmful for invest-
ments in young children. We review this evidence in Section 4 and discuss the benefits of
considering multi-period investments in human capital. The high estimated degree of com-
plementarity between early and late investments suggests that post-secondary aid policies
may come too late to help many youth from disadvantaged families.
Section 5 reviews intergenerational studies in which borrowing constraints determine
social mobility and the distribution of income. Some of these studies also quantify the
impacts of education-based government policies on these outcomes. While recent studies
are pessimistic about the benefits of additional subsidies for higher education, new efforts to
help finance earlier investments offer more promise.
Ad hoc assumptions about credit constraints constitute a common limitation across all
areas of the human capital literature. In Section 6, we propose a more careful treatment of
government loan programs and the incentive problems underlying private credit. We show
that endogenizing credit constraints for human capital helps explain certain features of the
data. We also demonstrate how the modern literature on optimal contracts under limited
commitment and private information can help provide new insights about the behavior of
human capital investments and the design of government programs.
1
2 Human Capital with Exogenous Borrowing Constraints
In this section, we consider a basic human capital model in which investments increase future
earnings but provide no additional utility benefits/costs. The model also abstracts from the
choice of leisure time. This canonical framework is useful for discussing many key economic
trade-offs, and its sharp predictions serve as the starting point for most empirical studies in
the literature on education and borrowing constraints. We next discuss how incorporating
non-pecuniary costs/benefits of human capital affects the interpretation of many empirical
studies in this area as discussed further in Section 3. We also briefly discuss the impacts of
borrowing constraints on other margins, including consumption, leisure and school quality.
2.1 A Basic Model
Consider two-period-lived individuals who invest in schooling in the first period and work in
the second. Preferences are
U = u (c0) + βu (c1) , (1)
where ct is consumption in periods t ∈ {0, 1}, β > 0 is a discount factor, and u (·) is strictly
increasing and concave and satisfies standard Inada conditions.
Each person is endowed with financial assets W ≥ 0 and ability a > 0.1 Initial assets
capture all familial transfers while ability reflects innate factors, early parental investments
and other characteristics that shape the returns to investing in schooling. We take (W,a) as
given to focus on schooling decisions that individuals make on their own; however, central
results can be generalized to an intergenerational environment in which parents endogenously
make transfers to their children (see Lochner and Monge-Naranjo 2011b).
During the schooling period, individuals make human capital investments h that increase
post-school labor earnings y = w1af (h). Each unit of h entails foregone wages w0 ≥ 0 and
tuition costs τ > 0; w1 is the price of human capital and f (·) is positive, strictly increasing
and concave. A higher ability a increases total and marginal returns to investment.2
1Evidence suggests that multiple skills/abilities are important in the labor market and help determine
schooling decisions (see, e.g., Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil 2011). Accounting for multiple abilities would
not change the substance of most theoretical results in this section, but it can be important for measuring
the empirical relevance of constraints.
2While there is no natural metric for ability a, this is consistent with commonly used separability between
2
Young individuals can borrow d (or save, in which case d < 0) at a gross interest rate
R > 1. Consumption levels in each period are
c0 = W + w0(1− h)− τh+ d, (2)
c1 = w1af (h)−Rd. (3)
Unrestricted optima. In the absence of credit market frictions, individuals maximize
utility (1) subject to (2) and (3). Human capital investment maximizes the present value of
net lifetime income, equating its marginal return with that of financial assets:
w1af
′ [hU (a)]
w0 + τ
= R. (4)
Optimal unrestricted investment hU (a) is strictly increasing in ability a and independent of
initial assets W .
Unconstrained optimal borrowing dU (a, w) smooths consumption over time, satisfying
the Euler equation:
u′
[
W + w0 + d
U (a,W )− (w0 + τ)hU (a)
]
= βRu′
[
w1af
[
hU (a)
]−RdU (a,W )] , (5)
whereW +w0 reflects ‘full wealth’ if no time is devoted to schooling. Unconstrained borrow-
ing strictly decreases in wealth and increases in ability. Greater ability increases borrowing
for two distinct reasons: (i) more able individuals wish to finance more investment; and (ii)
given any level of investment, more able individuals earn higher net lifetime income and wish
to consume more in the first period. Analogously, an increase in the return on investment
w1 leads to an increase in desired borrowing for everyone.
Borrowing Constraints. Now, consider an exogenously specified upper limit on the
amount of debt that individuals can accumulate:
d ≤ d¯, (6)
where 0 ≤ d¯ < ∞. This ad hoc restriction is common in the literature on borrowing
constraints and human capital. In Section 6, we discuss more realistic constraints derived
ability and human capital investment in log wages. Results discussed in this section generalize to an earnings
specification y = w1f(a, h) where f(·) is positive, strictly increasing and concave in both arguments, and
∂2f
∂a∂h > 0.
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explicitly from government student loan programs and limited commitment problems in
private lending markets.
The equation dU(a,W ) = d¯ implicitly defines a threshold level of assets Wmin (a) de-
termining who is constrained (W < Wmin (a)) and who is unconstrained (W ≥ Wmin (a)).
Constrained persons have high ability relative to their wealth, since Wmin (a) is increasing in
ability. Importantly, being ‘unconstrained’ may require much higher wealthW than is neces-
sary to cover tuition, since individuals also borrow to smooth consumption (i.e.W +w0 > τh
does not ensure that dU(a,W ) < d¯).
When the borrowing constraint binds, all possibilities to bring future resources to the
early (investment) period have been exhausted. Then, optimal investment hX satisfies
(w0 + τ)u
′ [W + w0 − (w0 + τ)hX + d¯] = βu′ [w1af (hX)−Rd¯]w1af ′ (hX) . (7)
The implied function hX (a,W ) strikes a balance between increasing lifetime earnings and
smoothing consumption, yielding a number of predictions that have been extensively exam-
ined in the empirical literature.
Empirical Predictions. Assume constraint (6) binds when referring to hX(a,W ). Then:
1. Constrained individuals under-invest in their human capital: hX (a,W ) < hU (a).
2. Unconstrained investment hU(a) is independent of wealthW , while constrained invest-
ment hX (a,W ) is strictly increasing in wealth and the borrowing limit d¯.
3. The marginal return on human capital MR(h) ≡ w1af ′[h]
w0+τ
is equal to the return on
savings R for unconstrained individuals and is strictly greater than R and strictly
decreasing in wealth W for constrained individuals.
4. Constrained investment hX(a,W ) decreases more with an increase in direct costs, τ ,
than with an equal increase in opportunity costs, w0 (i.e. −∂hX/∂w0 < −∂hX/∂τ).
Unconstrained investment responds equally to both costs (i.e. ∂hU/∂w0 = ∂h
U/∂τ).
These results follow from implicit differentiation of equations (4) and (7). The first three
are well-known since Becker (1967). They derive from the fact that the marginal cost of
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investment is higher for constrained individuals, since they cannot borrow to smooth con-
sumption over time. This causes constrained individuals to invest less, stopping school when
the marginal return is still relatively high. The fourth implication is derived by Cameron and
Taber (2004) in a slightly different setting. Here, it derives from the fact that an increase in
opportunity costs also raises ‘full wealth’ levels, while an increase in direct costs does not.3
We discuss empirical evidence related to these results in Section 3.
Predictions about the relationship between ability and constrained human capital invest-
ment hX are rarely discussed in the literature. Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011b) show
that this relationship is shaped by two opposing forces: (i) More able individuals earn a
higher return on human capital investment, so they would like to invest more. (ii) More
able individuals have higher lifetime earnings, so they would like to consume more at all
ages. This discourages investment, since constrained borrowers can only increase early con-
sumption by lowering investment. With empirically relevant preferences for intertemporal
consumption smoothing, the second effect can dominate and constrained investments would
be decreasing in ability.4
2.2 Incorporating Tastes for Schooling
To introduce non-pecuniary benefits/costs of education ξ to the model above, augment utility
so U = u (c0) + βu (c1) + ξh. The introduction of non-pecuniary benefits (ξ > 0) or costs
(ξ < 0) implies that unconstrained investment is not generally independent of wealth W .
Indeed, ∂h
U
∂W
> 0 and MR(hU) < R for ξ > 0, while ∂h
U
∂W
< 0 and MR(hU) > R for ξ < 0.5
As such, results 2 and 3 no longer imply simple ‘tests’ for borrowing constraints. Low-
wealth individuals may acquire low levels of schooling (and have a high marginal return
to investment), because they are more likely to be constrained or because schooling offers
non-pecuniary benefits. In contrast, result 4 is robust to the inclusion of non-pecuniary
3This asymmetry is more easily seen when investment can take only two values, h ∈ {0, 1}. In this case,
an increase in opportunity costs lowers resources in the no-schooling case when consumption is relatively
high, while an increase in tuition reduces resources in the schooling case when consumption is relatively low.
4This result also implies that an increase in the price of human capital w1 should lead to aggregate
reductions in investment among constrained individuals.
5Result 1 (i.e. hX < hU ) and comparative statics for constrained investment hX in results 2 and 3 continue
to hold.
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tastes, so tests for constraints based on the relative responsiveness of investment to direct
and opportunity costs of schooling (e.g. Cameron and Taber 2004) may be more informative.
The empirical literature that incorporates unobserved heterogeneity in non-pecuniary
tastes typically considers a discrete set of human capital investment choices (e.g. high school
vs. college attendance).6 Belley and Lochner (2007) show that in the absence of borrowing
constraints, the observed relationship between family resources and college attendance de-
pends on the correlation between ξ and W as well as the net financial returns to college.7
Importantly, given any stable relationship between tastes for schooling and family resources,
the correlation between family resources and the probability of attendance (conditional on
ability) should weaken (or become negative) as the net financial returns to college increase.
Intuitively, an increase in the return to college raises the relative value of college less for indi-
viduals with high wealth due to diminishing marginal utility of consumption.8 This need not
be true when borrowing constraints limit the consumption of low-wealth individuals. Con-
strained youth may benefit little from an increase in future labor market returns to school,
since additional post-school earnings cannot be used to increase consumption during school
when it is most valuable. As discussed below, these results are helpful for interpreting recent
changes in family income – college attendance relationships in light of the contemporaneous
increase in returns to college.
2.3 Other Margins: Consumption, Leisure, and School Quality
Credit constraints may affect other choices. Constrained youth are likely to have low levels of
consumption during school, and they may substitute leisure for work to alleviate the negative
impacts of constraints on consumption and investment. Constrained youth may also choose
6Cunha, Heckman and Navarro (2005) and Navarro (2010) argue that heterogeneity in non-pecuniary
factors is necessary to explain choices given the distribution of youth abilities and information about future
earnings prospects. Heterogeneity in other preference parameters (e.g. discount rates, risk aversion, value of
leisure) may also be important for explaining schooling allocations (Almlund, et al. 2011).
7Letting h ∈ {0, 1} reflect high school vs. college attendance, if net financial returns N(a) ≡ −τ +
R−1w1af(1) − [w0 + R−1w1af(0)] > 0 and ξ ⊥⊥ W , then the probability of college attendance should be
decreasing in W conditional on a.
8A similar result holds for an increase in non-wage benefits of work for college relative to high school jobs
as long as individuals have diminishing marginal utility for those benefits. However, the wealth – attendance
gradient could increase over time if non-wage benefits of college jobs became relatively more valuable for
wealthier individuals.
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to delay college entry (and its labor market rewards) to accumulate savings.
Finally, youth may adjust on the school quality margin given any level of attendance. The
model above does not distinguish between school quality and quantity; however, abstracting
from opportunity costs (i.e. w0 = 0), one can simply re-interpret h as the quality of school
conditional on school attendance.9 With this interpretation, constrained youth should attend
lower quality institutions, with quality increasing in wealth and the borrowing limit. This
implies that wage returns from college attendance should be lower for constrained youth,
since they effectively invest less at lower quality schools. As noted by Carneiro and Heckman
(2002), this prediction contrasts sharply with result 3 (i.e. that the marginal wage return to
investment is higher for constrained youth).
3 U.S. Evidence on Borrowing Constraints and College
The rising costs of and labor market returns to college in the U.S. since the early 1980s,
coupled with stable real government student loan limits, suggest that borrowing constraints
may be more salient now than thirty years ago. Consistent with this view, 26% of all
dependent undergraduate students at four-year public universities in the U.S. were borrowing
the maximum allowable amount from the Stafford Loan Program in 1999-2000, compared
to under 4% ten years earlier.10 To help meet increased student demand for funds, private
student credit increased rapidly from virtually zero in the early 1990s to 9% of all student
loan dollars distributed in 1999-2000 (College Board 2004). We review U.S.-based evidence
on the impacts of credit constraints on educational attainment, college quality, work while
in school, and consumption allocations.
3.1 Differences in Schooling Decisions by Family Income/Wealth
Many economists have examined the wide disparities in education by parental income, edu-
cation, and race to gauge the impact of borrowing constraints on education decisions.
9See Romano, Epple, and Sieg (2006), Avery and Turner (2010), Chade, Lewis, and Smith (2011), and
Fu (2011) for explicit analyses of college quality choice.
10Government student loan figures are taken from Tables 2.1 and 2.7 of Titus (2002). Stafford Loans (and
the earlier Supplemental Loans to Students) are the main source of government loans for undergraduates.
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Studies based on the 1979 Cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79)
generally find that family income played little role in college attendance decisions (after
controlling for adolescent ability and family background) during the early 1980s (Cameron
and Heckman 1998, 1999, Carneiro and Heckman 2002). Comparing education behaviors in
the NLSY79 with the 1997 Cohort of the NLSY (NLSY97), Belley and Lochner (2007) find
that family income has become a much more important determinant of college attendance
in the early 2000s.11 Youth from high income families in the NLSY97 are 16 percentage
points more likely to attend college than are youth from low income families, conditional on
adolescent cognitive achievement and family background. This is roughly twice the effect
observed in the NLSY79. The increased importance of income is mostly among lower and
middle ability youth.
The NLSY79 does not contain data on wealth. In the NLSY97, the combined effects of
family income and wealth on college attendance are roughly double the effects of income
alone (Belley and Lochner 2007).12 To address concerns about the endogeneity of family
wealth, Lovenheim (2011) uses data from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID)
to estimate the impacts of exogenous changes in housing wealth (driven by local housing
booms and busts) on post-secondary enrollment decisions. His estimates suggest that an
additional $10,000 in housing equity raises college enrollment by 0.7 percentage points, with
much larger effects among lower income families. He also finds that the impacts of housing
wealth have become more important in the 2000s; however, it is unclear whether this is due
to the increased liquidity of housing wealth or to a general increase in the effect of family
resources on schooling.
Belley and Lochner (2007) also use the NLSY79 and NLSY97 to examine the changing
role of family income for other college-related choices. Among lower ability groups, they
estimate weak effects of income on work (during the school year) for both NLSY cohorts.
Among the most able, the effects of income on work increase substantially over time. In
11Ellwood and Kane (2000) argue that college attendance differences by family income were already be-
coming more important by the early 1990s.
12NLSY97 youth from the highest family income and wealth quartiles are nearly 30 percentage points
more likely to attend college than those from the lowest income and wealth quartiles (controlling for ability
and family background).
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the NLSY97, the most able youth from low-income families work more weeks and nearly
twice as many hours per week during the school year than their higher income counterparts.
Estimated effects of family income on college entry delay are weak for both NLSY cohorts.13
The relationship between family income and the type of post-secondary institution in-
dividuals attend has changed since the early 1980s. While family income had little effect
on the choice of two-year vs. four-year institutions in the NLSY79, students from the high-
est income quartile in the NLSY97 are 11 percentage points more likely to be attending a
four-year institution than their counterparts from the bottom quartile conditional on ability
and family background (Belley and Lochner 2007).14 By contrast, the relationship between
family income and attendance at selective high quality institutions appears to have weakened
over this same period. Kinsler and Pavan (2010) estimate that (conditional on ability and
family background) moving from the bottom to top income quartile increased the probability
of attending a top quality college by about 25 percentage points in the NLSY79 and by only
16 percentage points in the NLSY97.
Among top (often private) schools, the sharp increases in tuition since the early 1980s
were generally accompanied by increases in financial aid for lower income students. This ef-
fectively increased the price of college quality more for high-income students relative to their
lower-income counterparts. This highlights the fact that need-based grants affect college at-
tendance and quality decisions through price effects as well as by providing liquidity.15 Both
effects weaken the relationship between family income and attendance or quality. Compli-
cating the role of financial aid, many low-income youth may be poorly informed about aid
opportunities or may find it difficult to fill out complex financial aid forms (Dynarski and
Scott-Clayton 2006, Bettinger, et al. 2009, Avery and Turner 2010).
One explanation for the observed positive relationship between family income and school-
ing is that higher income families place greater value on education. However, it is not clear
why this relationship would have strengthened so much since the early 1980s. As discussed
13Estimated effects of income on college entry delay and institution type for the NLSY79 are consistent
with those of Carneiro and Heckman (2002).
14Lovenheim and Reynolds (2011) also use the two NLSY cohorts to explore more detailed trends in college
enrollment by institution type.
15See Belley, Frenette and Lochner (2011) for a detailed accounting of net price and out-of-pocket expen-
ditures for college by family income in the U.S. and Canada.
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in Section 2.2, the increase in net returns to schooling should have weakened the income –
attendance relationship in the absence of borrowing constraints (if the relationship between
‘tastes’ for college and family income had remained stable).
3.2 Differential (Marginal) Returns to Schooling
As Card (1999) notes, many instrumental variables (IV) estimates of the wage return to
schooling exceed ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates by 20-30%. Based on the ‘local
average treatment effect’ (LATE) interpretation of IV, Lang (1993) and Card (1995, 1999)
have conjectured that borrowing constraints may explain this finding, since the instruments
used largely impact the decisions of low-income and potentially constrained youth. It is
argued that these IV estimators may reflect relatively high marginal returns for constrained
youth, while OLS estimates more closely reflect average returns in the population. However,
Carneiro and Heckman (2002) show that this is not generally the case with heterogeneous
returns to schooling and self-selection.16 Furthermore, marginal costs and returns to school-
ing may differ for reasons other than borrowing constraints, e.g. heterogeneity in tastes
for schooling. Unfortunately, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions on the importance of
borrowing constraints from this literature.
Cameron and Taber (2004) also examine returns to schooling, basing their analysis on
results 3 and 4 in Section 2.1. They argue that the set of individuals whose college-going is
affected by a change in direct costs (measured by whether there is a college in the individual’s
county of residence) should disproportionately include more credit constrained youth than
the set of individuals affected by a change in opportunity costs (measured by local low-skill
wage rates). Thus, IV estimates of the return to schooling using ‘college in county’ as an
instrument should exceed those using local low-skill wages (ignoring differences in college
quality) if borrowing constraints are important.17 Examining men from the NLSY79, they
16Carneiro and Heckman also raise other objections, including the use of ‘weak’ or ‘invalid’ instruments and
the potential for differences in school quality to affect the relative returns for constrained and unconstrained
students. See Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2011) for a clear analysis of treatment effects identified from
the use of different instrumental variables in the college-going context. See Heckman (2010) for a more
general discussion.
17This argument is based on the LATE interpretation of IV estimators. Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil
(2011) empirically show that both of these instruments identify the effects of schooling for similar subpopu-
lations.
10
find no evidence in support of credit constraints.
3.3 Structural Models
A few studies estimate lifecycle schooling models that exploit data on schooling choices,
earnings, and in some cases, assets and family transfers, to identify the role of borrowing
constraints. By estimating preferences, human capital production technology, and other
factors determining educational choices, this approach facilitates evaluation of a wide range
of potential policies.
Cameron and Taber (2004) estimate a lifecycle model with a discrete set of schooling
options and test whether individuals face different interest rates when making their schooling
decisions. In their model, evidence that some individuals face high interest rates relative
to others would imply that borrowing constraints distort their education decisions. The
main sources of identification for interest rate differences are the asymmetric impacts of
opportunity costs and direct costs as discussed above. Consistent with their IV analysis,
they find no heterogeneity in interest rates for their sample of NLSY79 men.
Keane and Wolpin (2001) estimate a dynamic model of schooling, work, and consumption
in a framework that incorporates borrowing constraints and parental transfers. They use
panel data on schooling and work (full-time and part-time), wages, and assets for white
males in the NLSY79. Importantly, Keane and Wolpin allow for unobserved heterogeneity
in the ability to acquire human capital, tastes for work and school, and borrowing limits.
Estimated borrowing limits are very tight (ranging from $600 to $1000 across individuals,
in 1987 dollars) — less than one-third the estimated cost of a single semester of school (about
$3,700). Not surprisingly, their simulations indicate an important role for parental transfers
and part-time work in enabling school attendance. They estimate that parents provide
between $3,300 and $10,000 in transfers while enrolled in school, with transfers increasing
in parental education. Transfers are estimated to be substantially lower when students are
not enrolled in school. Hence, a sizeable portion of parental transfers effectively acts as
a subsidy for education — a subsidy that is much larger for children with more educated
parents. Based on a series of simulations, Keane and Wolpin conclude that nearly all of
the (sizeable) differences in educational attainment by parental education are accounted for
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by higher enrollment-contingent parental transfers and unobserved heterogeneity. Increases
in available credit have negligible effects on schooling, but they reduce work and increase
consumption during school.
Johnson (2011) uses data on recent male high school graduates in the NLSY97 to estimate
a similar decision model with a few important extensions. He explicitly models government
student loan programs as well as a private credit limit, allows for differences in tuition across
states, incorporates need- and merit-based grants, and allows for exogenous unemployment.
Most importantly, he exploits additional data on average tuition by state and data on re-
ported grant aid and parental transfers in the NLSY97.18 He is able to infer consumption
during and after school, which helps identify who may or may not be constrained. His data
allow him to directly estimate parental transfer functions and student aid by parental in-
come, while Keane and Wolpin (2001) infer parental transfers indirectly from schooling and
work choices (and asset levels in later years).
Some of Johnson’s main findings are similar to those of Keane and Wolpin (2001):
parental transfers (especially the fact that schooling-contingent transfers are greater for
higher-income families) and unobserved heterogeneity are important determinants of school-
ing. While Johnson’s estimated borrowing limits are modest relative to college costs, they
are substantially greater than those of Keane and Wolpin (2001).19 Despite greater borrow-
ing opportunities, Johnson estimates a stronger, though still modest, impact of increasing
loan limits. Simulations suggest that an additional $1,500 in credit per year in school (for
everyone) would increase college completion rates by 4.5%. Allowing students to borrow
up to the total costs of schooling would increase completion rates by nearly 8%. Given the
low cost of extending government student loan programs, Johnson (2011) estimates that
increasing loan limits would have a greater impact on college outcomes than an increase in
education subsidies costing the same amount.
Borrowing constraints have small to modest impacts on schooling choices in these two
18Like Keane and Wolpin (2001), he also uses data on schooling, work, assets, and wages. Since many of
his respondents are still quite young, Johnson (2011) uses wages at ages 25+ from the NLSY79 cohort in
estimation. This effectively yields estimates that average the returns to schooling and experience across the
two NLSY cohorts.
19Youth attending college for four-years can borrow up to $23,000 from the Stafford Loan Program plus
as much as an estimated $11,700 in private loans for some types.
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studies for very different reasons. As discussed above, estimates from Keane and Wolpin
(2001) suggest that most students are constrained but that consumption and leisure are
distorted rather than schooling. That schooling is unaffected by borrowing constraints is not
surprising given other evidence based on the NLSY79. It is more surprising that Johnson
(2011) estimates that increasing borrowing limits would have only modest effects on college
completion given the increased importance of family income in the NLSY97. Despite the
fact that credit opportunities plus parental transfers allow for, at best, modest consumption
during school, Johnson estimates that few youth borrow up to their limit. In his model,
risk aversion, coupled with the possibility of very low income (associated with post-school
unemployment), prevents individuals from taking on much debt. His estimates suggest that
very few would choose to borrow more than $6,000.20
Navarro (2010) also explores the importance of heterogeneity, uncertainty, and borrowing
constraints as determinants of college attendance in a lifecycle framework. At each age,
borrowing constraints are given by the lowest possible discounted future income (i.e. the
‘natural’ limit of Aiyagari (1994)).21 An important innovation of this work is the empirical
methodology used to identify ex ante heterogeneity in abilities (and unobserved tastes for
college) separately from uncertainty about future income. Using schooling and earnings data
from the NLSY79 and PSID, Navarro estimates distributions of actual returns to college,
expected returns to college, and tastes for college. Because individuals would never choose to
borrow more than the ‘natural’ limit, relaxing this constraint by itself would have no effect
on behavior in his framework. His estimates suggest that eliminating uncertainty would
substantially change who attends college but would have little impact on the aggregate
attendance rate. Most interesting, he finds that simultaneously removing uncertainty and
borrowing constraints would lead to sizeable increases college attendance, pointing out an
important interaction between borrowing constraints and risk/uncertainty.
Assumptions about minimal income (or consumption) levels are crucial for the importance
of borrowing limits in lifecycle schooling models with uncertainty. The demand for credit
20While his model matches the fraction of 25 year-olds with net debt, it substantially underestimates the
fraction of youth with modest or high levels of debt.
21Empirically, he incorporates income transfers at each age so that the ‘natural’ borrowing limit equals
the lowest level of observed debt in his data.
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may be much higher with explicit insurance mechanisms or implicit ones such as bankruptcy,
default, or other options (e.g. deferment and forgiveness in government student loans). Of
course, private credit offerings may increase in response to any reductions in risk. A better
understanding and recognition of these issues in research on credit constraints and education
is needed as we discuss in Section 6.
The results of Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Johnson (2011) suggest that many youth
would not attend college without schooling-contingent transfers from their parents even if
credit were abundant. So, why do wealthier parents effectively subsidize so much schooling
if their children are not willing to pay for it themselves? Taken at face value, these results
suggest that many parents must value their children’s education more than their children do.
This gives rise to three potential explanations for the strong positive relationship between
parental income/education and schooling-contingent subsidies: (i) All parents have similar
tastes for schooling, but poor parents may be constrained in what they can afford to pass
on to their children. (ii) All parents have similar tastes for schooling, but wealthier parents
prefer to buy more of it like they do other normal goods. (iii) Wealthier parents have a
stronger preference for schooling than poor parents. Notably, these explanations mirror the
earlier discussion of the wealth – schooling relationship, only for parents rather than for
students themselves.
While the results of Keane andWolpin (2001) and Johnson (2011) suggest that expansions
in student loan programs are likely to have limited effects on college-going, they effectively
shift the ‘constrained’ question up a generation. It is not clear how these results help explain
the dramatic increase in family income – attendance gaps over the past few decades. Efforts
to endogenize parental transfer decisions would help in answering this question.
Adolescent ‘endowments’ or abilities also play a central role in determining the rela-
tionship between socioeconomic background and education (and earnings) outcomes in both
Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Johnson (2011). This is also true in studies explicitly an-
alyzing education gaps by family income (e.g. Cameron and Heckman 1998, Carneiro and
Heckman 2002, Belley and Lochner 2007). Yet, these endowments are typically treated as
exogenous and invariant to policy. Recent work discussed in Section 4 endogenizes these
endowments through early investments by families and schools.
14
Finally, the empirical literature on borrowing constraints and education is almost exclu-
sively partial equilibrium. Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) and Gallipoli, Meghir and
Violante (2011) show that incorporating general equilibrium effects on skill prices can con-
siderably dampen the impacts of education policies on schooling. We discuss macro-based
general equilibrium studies in Section 5.
3.4 Other Approaches to Identifying Constraints
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008) take a novel approach to measuring borrowing con-
straints by directly asking students enrolled at Berea College in Kentucky whether they
would like to borrow more if they could (at a ‘fair’ interest rate). It is important to note
that the typical student at Berea College comes from a low-income family; however, the
college is unique in that it effectively charges zero tuition and offers large room and board
subsidies. Despite these unique institutional features, college dropout rates are similar to
those for low-income students in the U.S. as a whole. While Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner
(2008) find that many Berea students live on a very tight budget, only about one-in-five
reports that they would like to borrow more if they could (i.e. ‘constrained’). They further
estimate that college drop out rates (by the beginning of year two) are about 13 percentage
points higher (or roughly double) for ‘constrained’ youth relative to those that are ‘uncon-
strained’. Adjusting for other potential determinants of dropout reduces this difference to
about 11 percentage points.
Brown, Scholz and Seshadri (2011) explicitly model intergenerational relationships and
derive a new way of identifying which youth may be affected by borrowing constraints.
Their model assumes that youth would be borrowing constrained if they did not receive
help from their parents; although, this assumption could be relaxed without changing the
spirit of the results. Parents are assumed to be able to borrow freely, but they cannot write
enforceable loan contracts with their children. As a result, they may not want to trans-
fer enough resources to satisfy their children’s demand for consumption and schooling at
college ages. In this case, parents would provide all their transfers to their children when
they were college-age, but children would under-invest. By contrast, unconstrained families
will transfer enough resources to their children to support optimal investment, continuing to
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make transfers after their children leave school. These results suggest that one can distin-
guish between ‘constrained’ and ‘unconstrained’ families based on the presence of post-school
parental transfers. Brown, Scholz and Seshadri show that in their framework, total human
capital investment should be more sensitive to a tuition subsidy among constrained youth
than among unconstrained youth.22
Based on these insights, Brown, Scholz and Seshadri use intergenerational data on ed-
ucational attainment and family transfers from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS)
to estimate the effects of borrowing constraints on schooling in the U.S. during the 1970s,
1980s, and 1990s. They identify ‘constrained’ youth as those receiving no post-school fam-
ily transfers.23 Because the HRS do not contain information on educational subsidies/aid,
they use sibling spacing as an instrument for student aid. Families with multiple children in
college at the same time generally qualify for more aid than families with children attending
at different times. Their estimates suggest that among ‘constrained’ youth, an additional
$3,600 in aid (i.e. 4 vs. 0 years of sibling overlap in college) increases average schooling by
0.2 years. Estimated effects of additional aid on ‘unconstrained’ youth are negligible.
3.5 Summarizing the Evidence
Most studies analyzing the NLSY79 data find little evidence that borrowing constraints
affected college-going in the early 1980s. Significant increases in the share of students ‘maxing
out’ their federal student loan opportunities and a doubling in family income – college
attendance gradients for recent cohorts suggest that constraints have become more salient
in recent years. Because differences in parental transfers and the degree of labor market risk
are also important factors in explaining income – attendance patterns, the literature has yet
to reach a consensus on the extent to which constraints discourage youth for recent cohorts.
Borrowing constraints may affect more than college attendance. For example, family
income has become a more important determinant of attendance at four-year (relative to two-
year) schools, while it has become less important for attendance at very selective institutions.
Borrowing constraints could also delay college attendance, but the evidence reveals little
22As Carneiro and Heckman (2002) discuss, this result does not necessarily generalize to other models.
23For their main sample, they measure transfers during 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004. A supplementary
sample measures ‘substantial’ transfers prior to 1994. End of life bequests are not included.
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impact on this margin. Instead, constrained students appear to work more and consume less
while in school than those that are unconstrained.
4 Early Investments in Children
There is strong evidence that adolescent skill levels are important in determining subsequent
schooling and lifetime earnings (see, e.g., Cameron and Heckman 1998, Keane and Wolpin
1997, 2001, and Carneiro and Heckman 2002). Moreover, evidence from consumption alloca-
tions suggests that liquidity constraints are most salient for younger households (e.g. Meghir
and Weber 1996, Alessie, Devereux, and Weber 1997, Stephens 2008). Yet, few studies
examine the impacts of borrowing constraints on early investments in young children.
Indirect evidence suggests that constraints at early ages may play a more important role
in determining human capital investment than constraints at later ages. For example, most
empirical studies find high lifetime returns for early childhood programs, especially for the
most disadvantaged children (e.g., see Karoly et al. 1998, Blau and Currie 2006, or Cunha,
et al. 2006, Heckman, et al. 2010). A few studies also find that family income received at
early childhood ages has a greater impact on achievement and educational attainment when
compared with income received at later ages (e.g. Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 1997, Duncan,
et al. 1998, Levy and Duncan 1999, Caucutt and Lochner 2006, 2011).24 More generally,
recent studies show that exogenous increases in family income lead to improvements in early
child development.25
Credit constraints are natural candidates to explain why most low-income children do
not participate in quality preschool programs despite the high economic returns. Even
though elementary and secondary education is publicly provided, the quality of public schools
available to poor American families is often low, while high quality private schools and
24Carneiro and Heckman (2002) argue that early income should have a larger effect than later income due
purely to discounting (e.g. $1 at age 0 should have an effect that is (1 + r)10 larger than income at age 10,
where r is the annual interest rate). Accounting for this, they estimate similar effects of ‘early’ and ‘late’
family income on college enrolment in the Children of the NLSY (CNLSY); however, they also control for age
12 achievement levels which may absorb much of the effect of earlier income. Caucutt and Lochner (2006,
2011) estimate that (discounted) income received at earlier ages has a larger impact on age 5-14 cognitive
achievement and educational attainment in the CNLSY than (discounted) income received at later ages.
25See, e.g., Akee, et al. (2010), Løken (2010), Løken, Mogstad and Wiswall (2010), Duncan, Morris and
Rodrigues (2011), Milligan and Stabile (2011), and Dahl and Lochner (forthcoming).
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preschool programs are typically quite expensive. Parental time is also a valuable input that
poor parents may be unable to afford. Finally, most parents of young children are young
themselves, in the early stages of their careers with relatively low earnings.
To better understand the role of borrowing constraints at early childhood and adolescent
ages, it is useful to generalize the human capital production function in Section 2 to include
multiple periods of investment. To focus on intertemporal issues related to borrowing con-
straints, we abstract from allocation decisions across different inputs within periods (e.g.
parental time vs. schools vs. family goods inputs).26 For simplicity, suppose human capital
upon labor market entry H depends on early childhood investment h1, adolescent investment
h2, and ability a:
H = af(h1, h2). (8)
As discussed in Cunha, et al. (2006) and Cunha and Heckman (2007), the dynamic
complementarity between early and late investments (as measured by ∂
2f
∂h1∂h2
or the elasticity
of substitution) is crucial for the accumulation of human capital over the lifecycle. With
strong complementarity, it is difficult to compensate for a lack of early investment at later
ages. In this case, inadequate early investments lead to low returns for later investments,
consistent with evidence in Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Cameron and Heckman (1998).
The estimates of Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) suggest that investments are
quite complementary over time, with the degree of dynamic complementarity growing with
age for cognitive skills.27 They find that it is optimal to invest relatively more in young
children with investment declining with age. This is particularly true for children with
low initial endowments. An optimal path of declining investment contrasts sharply with
the typical pattern of increasing parental earnings over the lifecycle. To the extent that
borrowing constraints limit early investments in some children, those early deficits are likely
to be compounded over time.
Two recent studies consider the importance of dynamic complementarity in investments
26See, Del Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall (2010), Todd and Wolpin (2003, 2007), and Cunha, Heckman and
Schennach (2010) for analyses that consider multiple inputs each period.
27Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) estimate elasticities of substitution ranging from 0.4 to 1.5.
They use data from the Children of the NLSY and exploit a dynamic non-linear factor structure and multiple
measurements for cognitive and non-cognitive skills and family investments.
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over the lifecycle when financial markets are imperfect.28 Cunha (2007) estimates a similar
lifecycle human capital production technology to that of Cunha, Heckman and Schennach
and embeds it in a Laitner (1992) overlapping-generations general equilibrium model. In
this model, individuals never borrow up to the ‘natural’ limit, but there are no explicit
constraints on lifecycle borrowing. Parents cannot leave negative transfers to their children;
however. Caucutt and Lochner (2011) develop and calibrate a similar dynastic overlapping-
generations model; however, they incorporate age-specific borrowing constraints. Focusing
on ‘early’ vs. ‘late’ investments, they consider a six-period model of the lifecycle, with ‘late’
investments corresponding to different levels of educational attainment.29
Caucutt and Lochner find that many young and middle-age parents are borrowing con-
strained, including some with higher education. However, like Keane and Wolpin (2001)
and Johnson (2011), their model suggests that there would be little impact on human cap-
ital investment (‘early’ or ‘late’) from relaxing borrowing constraints on college-age youth
or their parents. By contrast, relaxing constraints on young parents would lead to sizeable
short-run increases in both ‘early’ investments in young children and ‘late’ investments in
older children (e.g. high school completion and college). Long-run effects of such a policy
are quite different. Since relaxing the borrowing constraint for young parents causes families
to accumulate more debt over time, future generations find themselves constrained to nearly
the same extent that initial generations were before the constraint was relaxed. On average,
this shift in assets results in negligible long-run effects on average human capital levels.
Simulations by both Cunha (2007) and Caucutt and Lochner (2011) suggest that subsi-
dies for early investment produce much greater gains in human capital than (fiscally equiva-
lent) subsidies for late investment. Dynamic complementarity implies that families with few
resources when their children are young do not fully capitalize on subsidies at later ages,
because it is too costly to adjust early investments. Those that receive inadequate early in-
28Del Boca, Flinn and Wiswall (2010) estimate the productivity of both time and goods inputs over
childhood; however, they abstract from borrowing and saving altogether and focus primarily on within
period investment choices. Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) calibrate a dynastic equilibrium model of human
capital production with early and late investments; however, they also abstract from borrowing and saving
and make strong assumptions about the interaction of investments over time. We discuss Restuccia and
Urrutia in Section 5.
29Both Cunha (2007) and Caucutt and Lochner (2011) identify a similar degree of complementarity be-
tween early and late human capital investment to that estimated by Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010).
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vestments do not find it worthwhile to make additional later investments (especially college)
even if they are heavily subsidized. By contrast, early investment subsidies enable fami-
lies to increase investments in their young children without sacrificing current consumption
or borrowing more. Those investments can then be matched with later investments when
constraints are less severe.
Dynamic complementarity also implies that college-age subsidies lead to increases in
earlier investments and adolescent skill levels, effects neglected in most analyses of higher
education policy. Caucutt and Lochner (2011) show that ignoring early investment responses
would cause researchers to significantly under-estimate policy impacts on college attendance
as well as future wage levels.
5 Macroeconomic Perspectives
Human capital has received wide attention in the literature on cross-country income dif-
ferences.30 Yet, less attention has been given to the role of the different factors, including
credit constraints, that explain cross-country human capital differences.31 We now review
the literature on the macroeconomic consequences of credit market imperfections, including
the impact on social (intergenerational) mobility, the overall distribution of skills and income
and the effect of government policies.
5.1 Aggregate Schooling and Income
Credit constraints can be a key determinant of aggregate human capital. Recent work by
Cordoba and Ripoll (2011) shows that introducing credit constraints significantly improves
the ability of a Ben-Porath (1967) type model to explain cross-country variation in the
average years of schooling and the gap between returns to schooling and returns on riskless
financial assets. In a frictionless model, aggregate human capital investments are entirely
determined by the life-span of individuals in a country, its total factor productivity (TFP)
and tax policies. Cordoba and Ripoll show that credit constraints can also add parental
lifetime income, family size, and the supply of public education as determinants of education
30See, e.g., Hall and Jones (1999), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), and Klenow and Rodriguez (1997).
31However, see Bils and Klenow (2000), Kaboski (2007), Manuelli and Seshadri (2010).
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investments. By incorporating these factors, their model better explains observed cross-
country differences in human capital stocks.
Aside from effects on aggregate investment levels, credit constraints could reduce the effi-
ciency of investment in human capital by diverting education from the most able youth from
poor families towards less able youth from wealthier families. Empirically, this distortion
could show up in a country’s schooling sector TFP (as in Caucutt and Kumar 2003) or in
its TFP for consumption goods (as in Benabou 2002). Understanding these mechanisms re-
quires models in which the distribution of income is endogenously determined by preferences
and market opportunities. We briefly review this literature next.
5.2 Inequality and Persistence of Skills and Income
Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986) and Loury (1981) pioneered the development of fully con-
sistent economic models of the income distribution based on intergenerational transfers and
investments in human capital. In these models, human capital for generation t depends on
the investments and ability for that generation. It may also depend on shocks to the pro-
duction of human capital as well as the human capital of one’s parents. Ability is typically
assumed to follow a first order Markov process across generations, and earnings generally
depend on human capital levels, independent idiosyncratic market shocks, and the economy-
wide price of human capital. Credit constraints also limit the capacity of poor parents to
invest in their children.
In terms of preferences, the standard assumption is that of ‘altruistic’ preferences, when
parents directly value their children’s welfare.32 Other, simpler forms of preferences are also
sometimes used. ‘Paternalistic’ preferences assume that parents directly value human capital
investments or outcomes, or even earnings.33 Finally, ‘warm-glow’ preferences assume that
parents directly value transfers/bequests to their children, not caring what children do with
the money.34 The form of intergenerational preferences can have important consequences.
The pioneering work by Becker and Tomes (1979) and Loury (1981) assumes all human
capital is in the form of parental investments in their children. Both analyses rule out finan-
32See, e.g., Becker and Tomes (1986), Loury (1981), and Benabou (2002).
33Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Fernandez and Rogerson (1998) use variations of these preferences.
34See, e.g., Galor and Zeira (1993) and De Nardi (2004).
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cial transfers and derive conditions for the economy to converge to a unique invariant income
(and skill) distribution from any initial conditions. In both cases, the economy is ‘ergodic’
in the sense that the impact of initial conditions for a dynasty progressively washes out with
the passing of time and generations. The asymptotic distribution of (relative) incomes for
any dynasty (across generations) is exactly the same as the cross-sectional distribution for
the economy as a whole. ‘Regression to the mean’ arises since richer (poorer) than average
parents tend to have richer (poorer) than average children, but the gaps tend to close over
time.
In Loury (1981), parents are altruistic and a positive intergenerational persistence in
income arises even when ability is not correlated across generations. Incomplete markets are
important to generate social mobility; otherwise, if parents could fully insure against the
ability of their offspring, the relative wealth of different dynasties would never change. On
the other hand, with paternalistic preferences, Becker and Tomes (1979) show how social
mobility is driven by intergenerational persistence in ability, the variance of labor market
shocks, and the extent to which parents value the income of their children.
Becker and Tomes (1986) extend their earlier analysis, incorporating ability-investment
complementarity, non-negative parent-to-child financial transfers, and altruistic preferences.
Constrained families leave zero financial bequests and underinvest in their children, even if
their entire parental transfer is in human capital. Interestingly, their model suggests that
the relationship between ability and investment might be negative for constrained families
as discussed in Section 2.1.
The form of human capital investment technology can be crucial for the behavior of ag-
gregate economies. For instance, Galor and Zeira (1993) introduce indivisibilities in human
capital investment: individuals either attend or do not attend college. In the presence of
credit market imperfections (modelled as a positive gap between borrowing and lending in-
terest rates), Galor and Zeira show that non-convexities in investment can lead to multiple
steady states and, hence, can explain persistent differences in per capita output across coun-
tries. The steady states in Galor and Zeira fall into three categories: (i) global poverty traps
(the entire population is unschooled), (ii) a perfect caste system with “individual poverty
trap” where some dynasties are forever unschooled while the others are forever schooled;
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or (iii) a fully developed country/skilled population equilibrium. Which steady states arise
depends entirely on the initial distribution of wealth and skills, a sharp contrast with the
ergodicity in Loury (1981) and Becker and Tomes (1979).35 The key for these differences
in aggregate investments and social mobility is non-convexity in schooling choices, not the
form of preferences. Indeed, Caucutt and Kumar (2003) find similar results with altruistic
preferences.
Aiyagari, Greenwood and Seshadri (2002) and Caucutt and Kumar (2003) develop early
quantitative frameworks to study the formation of human capital and the evolution of earn-
ings across generations. Aiyagari, Greenwood and Seshadri (2002) compare economies with
full and partial altruism, and economies with incomplete insurance markets. They show
that credit constraints and lack of insurance does not necessarily lead to underinvestment;
indeed, it can lead to overinvestment. However, investment is generally inefficient, since it
is not necessarily directed towards the most able children.
Caucutt and Kumar (2003) assume altruistic preferences and lumpy human capital in-
vestments with uncertain payoffs (i.e. students may fail to complete school). As in most of
this literature, Caucutt and Kumar rule out financial investments/transfers and assume that
families cannot insure against the different risks they face, including the possibility of school
failure (which depends on ability) and uncertainty in the ability levels of grandchildren and
subsequent generations. To fit intergenerational schooling relationships in the data, they in-
troduce an additional form of intergenerational persistence, namely that parental education
directly enters the probability that children successfully complete college. Their preferred
calibration captures the share of college educated workers, the college wage premium, and
the enrollment and dropout rates of children conditional on parental education as observed
in the U.S.
Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) extend the dynastic framework of Caucutt and Kumar
(2003) to include a period of early investment in children along with a college attendance de-
35The lack of ergodicity is likely to hold even with ability shocks, as long as abilities are always high
enough so that rich individuals always find it worthwhile to invest in college. One way to induce ergodicity
is to introduce large (and uninsured) post-investment income shocks that consistently move dynasties away
from the attraction of ‘unschooled’ and ‘schooled’ resting points. If so, unschooled rich (impoverished poor)
parents may (not) transfer enough resources for the child to go to school.
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cision at later ages. Early investments (and innate abilities) are assumed to increase earnings
associated with college attendance as well as the likelihood of finishing college. Borrowing
and saving, as well as intergenerational financial transfers, are ruled out. Calibrating their
model to U.S. data, they argue that differences in early investments by parental income
are largely responsible for observed levels of intergenerational persistence, since the lack of
credit availability is particularly problematic for poor young parents (for reasons discussed
previously in Section 4).
Gallipoli, Meghir and Violante (2011) incorporate schooling in a lifecycle model with
consumption and labor supply decisions. Individuals face debt limits and a wedge between
borrowing and lending interest rates. The framework allows for heterogeneity in ability and
a rich structure of productivity shocks. This problem is embedded in a dynastic general
equilibrium environment with imperfect substitutability between the human capital of dif-
ferent schooling types. Their model explains schooling patterns as well as cross-sectional
and lifecycle earnings, consumption and labor supply behavior in the U.S.
5.3 Government Policies
When credit constraints limit the ability of younger generations to invest in human capital,
private market allocations can be inefficient and government enforced transfers from older to
younger generations may increase overall efficiency. In many cases, those transfers may not
be politically implementable, because they entail losses for older generations.36 However,
as argued by Boldrin and Montes (2004), intergenerational conflict can be averted – and
efficiency restored – if public schooling policies are tied to other government transfers. While
they consider a very stylized environment with three homogeneous generations and exogenous
constraints, their logic provides a useful reference point for three key limitations in the design
of government policies: (i) heterogeneity; (ii) endogeneity of private credit constraints; and
(iii) risks and incentive problems.
Heterogeneity in abilities and family resources can be a major limitation for the efficacy of
36This presumes resources in education are used efficiently. If not, then improvements in the efficiency of
schooling may be achieved without requiring intergenerational transfers. Alternatively, it may be feasible
for older generations to capitalize on the returns from investment in the young, a possibility ruled out by
the simple structure of Boldrin and Montes (2004).
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government programs. Benabou (2002) considers progressive income taxation and education
subsidies in economies with heterogeneous agents and characterizes the trade-offs between
efficiency (and growth) with insurance. In practice, many government programs attempt
to cope with heterogeneity offering differential treatment in terms of ability (merit-based)
or in terms of resources (need-based). However, merit-based programs may be imprecise in
differentiating by ability, especially at younger ages when investments may have high returns
and credit constraints may be most severe. Need-based programs may be more precisely
targeted, but they can lead to inefficient over-investment by lower ability individuals.37
Caucutt and Kumar (2003) and Gallipoli, Violante and Meghir (2011) consider the im-
pacts of different education policies paid for with proportional income taxes. In both frame-
works, need-based subsidies help alleviate borrowing constraints, but they also encourage
some low ability poor youth to over-invest. Taxes required to finance subsidies and a re-
duction in the wage premium for educated workers dampen schooling responses in general
equilibrium. Overall, welfare and aggregate productivity gains from increases in current aid
levels are found to be quite small. Caucutt and Kumar (2003) further find that a combined
need- and merit-based subsidy does no better in terms of welfare than a simple need-based
subsidy. Gallipoli, Violante and Meghir (2011) find similar efficiency gains (to need-based
subsidies) for a policy that both increases student loan limits and reduces borrowing interest
rates.
Enriching the analysis with early investments significantly changes the implications for
government policies. Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) find that increasing government funding
for early schooling substantially increases social mobility, aggregate human capital, consump-
tion and output. By contrast, increasing subsidies to college (late) education has negligible
effects on social mobility and produces smaller increases in aggregate human capital, out-
put, and consumption. While this policy increases college enrollment rates, it also increases
college failure rates, reducing the efficiency of the college sector.
Incorporating early investment endogeneizes the formation of — and heterogeneity in —
37The regional scope of public schooling can be another limitation for merit- and need- based policies.
As individuals sort across regions of different incomes, the quality of schooling could greatly differ across
youth of similar ability but different family resources. See, Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Fernandez
and Rogerson (1998).
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ability, effectively moving the model closer to one with homogeneous agents as in Boldrin
and Montes (2004). Indeed, Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) report that calibrating their model
without early education requires a much greater exogenous dispersion in innate abilities to
fit the data.
Another major consideration for the analysis of government policies that is typically
neglected is the endogenous response of private market arrangements. As stressed in the
next section, credit constraints arise from repayment incentive problems and institutional
features of the economy. These incentive problems are affected by taxes and subsidies that
governments impose on the different actions and outcomes of individuals. For example,
Andolfatto and Gervais (2006) show that when credit constraints are endogenously driven
by limited commitment, transfers to young and old (from middle-age workers) could reduce
the supply of resources for youth to invest in human capital, since default incentives induce
private lenders to reduce student credit by more than the youth transfer amount.38
Finally, the risky nature of human capital can give rise to many incentive problems,
including imperfect observability and moral hazard during and after school. Much of the
research on human capital has yet to incorporate lessons from the literature on optimal
contracts with dynamic incentive problems. We discuss some of these issues in Section 6.
5.4 Cross-Country Variation in Access to Credit
The literature is silent about cross-country differences in access to credit; however, there is
evidence of significant cross-country dispersion in the effect of household wealth on educa-
tional attainment in developing countries (e.g. Filmer and Pritchett 1999). To capture these
differences, one could try to measure and account for differences in the levels of credit in each
country (e.g. as Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2011) do for firm external financing). Taking
this further, one could endogenize credit constraints based on institutions and policies in
each country. These unexplored avenues could lead to new insights on differences in human
capital accumulation across countries and the impact of different government policies.
38Wang (2011) further examines the conditions under which full efficiency can be restored with endogenous
credit constraints.
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6 The Nature of Borrowing Constraints for Education
Despite extensive interest on the impact of credit constraints on the market for human
capital, little attention has been paid to the underlying institutions and incentive problems
limiting the access to credit for young individuals with little collateral to pledge. Instead,
nearly all theoretical and empirical work assumes ad hoc limits on borrowing (as in Section 2)
or arbitrary differences in interest rates based on family income. These simple assumptions
are at odds with the actual operation of public and private sources of credit for education.
This section shows that more realistic assumptions about government and private lending
can be useful for understanding the behavior of human capital investments. We begin by
discussing individual behavior when future incomes are certain, then introduce uncertainty
about returns to human capital.
6.1 Government Student Loans and Limited Commitment
Many students turn to government student loan (GSL) programs and private lenders to help
finance tuition and living costs while enrolled in college.39 GSL programs explicitly link
credit to educational expenditures, while private lenders extend credit to students based on
their prospects of repayment and projected future earnings. We now describe the constraints
implied by central features of existing GSL programs and private lending within the context
of the two-period model of Section 2.1.
GSL programs. Lending programs supported by the federal U.S. government generally
have three salient features. First, lending is directly tied to investment. Students (or parents)
can only borrow up to the total cost of college (including tuition, room, board, books, and
other expenses directly related to schooling) less any other financial aid they receive in the
form of grants or scholarships. Thus, GSL programs do not finance non-schooling related
consumption expenses. Second, GSL programs set upper loan limits on the total amount
of credit available for each student. Stafford and Perkins Loans are subject to both annual
39Low-income families are targeted by federal and state aid, e.g. Pell Grants, to finance the cost of college.
Moreover, private and public institutions supplement these funds with their own grant aid. However, for
many students, there remains a gap between the cost of college and the resources available from grants and
their families. See Belley, Frenette and Lochner (2011) for a detailed description of need-based aid.
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and lifetime limits.40 Third, GSL programs typically have extended mechanisms to enforce
repayment as compared to unsecured private loans. For example, student loans cannot be
expunged through bankruptcy; tax offsets and wage garnishments can be used to collect
amounts owed.41
The first two features of GSL programs imply that government borrowing dg must satisfy
dg ≤ min
{
τh, d¯
}
. (9)
The upper limit d¯ is specified by law as part of GSL programs. Given their strong enforce-
ment, assume for now that government loans must be repaid. In Subsection 6.2, we consider
more general models with default.42
Private Lending. The importance of private lending markets for schooling has skyrocketed
from virtually zero in the early 1990s to over $15 billion in 2005-06, 20% of all student loan
dollars distributed (College Board 2006). Credit cards have also become an important source
of funds for students (Nellie Mae 2005).
In modeling private lending, it is useful to derive credit constraints that arise endoge-
nously when lenders have limited mechanisms for enforcing repayment (e.g. Andalfatto and
Gervais 2006, Lochner and Monge-Naranjo 2011b).43 A rational borrower repays private
loans if and only if repaying is less costly than defaulting. These limited incentives can
be foreseen by rational lenders who, in response, limit their supply of credit to amounts
that will be repaid.44 Since penalties for default typically impose a larger monetary cost on
borrowers with higher earnings and assets, credit offered to an individual is directly related
to his perceived future earnings. Because expected earnings are determined by ability and
investment, private credit limits and investments are co-determined in equilibrium.
Assume that the cost of default on private loans is equal to a fraction 0 < κ˜ < 1 of
40From 1993-2007, undergraduate annual Stafford Loan limits for dependent students ranged from $2,625
(first year) to $4,000 (years 3-5) with a cumulative total of $23,000. Graduate students could borrow $18,500
per year, accumulating up to $138,500 in Stafford Loan debt.
41See Ionescu (2008, 2009, 2011) and Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011b) for a more detailed description
of GSL programs.
42In practice, default rates have hovered around 5-10% over the past 15 years.
43Indeed, limited repayment enforcement is the central justification for assuming credit market imperfec-
tions in the education sector (Becker 1967).
44Gropp, Scholz, and White (1997) empirically support this form of response by private lenders.
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labor earnings.45 Then, borrowers repay if and only if the payment Rdp is less than the
punishment cost κ˜af(h). As a result, credit from private lenders is limited to a fraction of
post-school earnings
dp ≤ κ˜R−1af (h) , (10)
and is increasing in both ability and investment. Ability also indirectly affects credit through
its influence on investment.
Total borrowing d of a student that can borrow dg from the GSL, subject to (9), and dp
from private lenders, subject to (10), is constrained by
d = dg + dp ≤ min
{
τh, d¯
}
+ κ˜R−1af (h) . (11)
Assuming GSL repayments are fully enforced, government credit does not crowd out private
credit. Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011b) show that a similar constraint holds in a lifecycle
model that includes both temporary exclusion from credit markets and wage garnishments
as punishments for default. However, in that model partial crowd out arises even if GSL
credit is fully enforceable. In general, some crowding out is expected to arise because of
lower incentives to repay private debt.
Empirical Implications. Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011b) show that this form of
endogenous credit constraint can explain a number of patterns observed in higher education
as the equilibrium responses to the increased returns to and costs of college observed since
the early 1980s, given stable GSL limits. Their quantitative analysis suggests that in the
early 1980s, the GSL provided adequate credit to most students and only a few would have
needed private funding. College attendance was, therefore, largely independent of family
resources. The rising college costs and returns over time have encouraged more recent cohorts
to invest and borrow more, those exhausting GSL credit choosing to borrow from private
lenders. Private lenders have responded by endogenously raising their credit limits, though
not enough to ensure efficient investment for everyone.
Another implication is that some of the distortionary effects of credit constraints is shifted
onto consumption and away from investment. This prediction arises from the link of GSL and
45This is consistent with wage garnishments and costly penalty avoidance actions like re-locating, working
in the informal economy, borrowing from loan sharks, or renting instead of buying a home.
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private credit to investment and is consistent with the findings of Keane and Wolpin (2001),
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008), and Johnson (2011). Indeed, Lochner and Monge-
Naranjo show that constrained individuals may not under-invest at all, since additional
investments (at the margin) can be financed with additional government or private loans.
The endogenous nature of private and GSL credit also accommodates greater investment
among the most able, since total credit is increasing in both investment and ability. In
general, constrained investment is more likely to be increasing in ability than when credit
limits are exogenous (Lochner and Monge-Naranjo 2011b).
A framework with endogenous credit constraints is useful for studying the interaction
between private credit and GSL programs and other government policies. Simulations by
Lochner and Monge-Naranjo suggest that expansions of public credit have only modest crowd
out effects on private lending. Increases in GSL limits lead to higher levels of total credit
and raise human capital investment among constrained youth. Additionally, changes in GSL
credit tend to have a relatively greater impact on investment among the least able, while
changes in private loan enforcement tend to impact investment more among the most able.
Finally, endogenous borrowing constraints make human capital investment more sensitive to
government education subsidies. Policies that encourage investment are met with enhanced
access to credit, further encouraging investment. This ‘credit expansion effect’, absent with
fixed constraints, can be quite large.
6.2 Uncertainty, Default and Other Incentive Problems
To capture other important incentive problems, we now introduce risky returns and discuss
the implications of imperfect insurance and private information for the provision of credit
and human capital investment. Incorporating ideas from the literatures on optimal con-
tracting with limited commitment, private information, and moral hazard can be helpful for
understanding schooling, borrowing, and repayment decisions. It also offers useful guidance
in designing efficient policies to provide both credit and insurance for schooling in a risky
environment.
For simplicity, we abstract from forgone wages and normalize tuition costs to one (i.e.
w0 = 0 and τ = 1). Assume now that the second period price of human capital is stochastic
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and can take on i = 1, ..., N possible realizations. Let pi > 0 denote the probability of
realization w1,i which we order so that w1,1 < w1,2 < ... < w1,N . Assume that the individual
and potential lenders observe the true probabilities as well as individual ability a and initial
assets W .46 Individuals maximize expected utility
U = u (c0) + β
N∑
i=1
piu (c1,i) ,
where c1,i is second period consumption associated with realization i.
Let Di be the (possibly negative) quantity that a person commits to repay in the second
period, potentially contingent on the realization i. Budget constraints are
c0 = W − h+
N∑
i=1
qiDi,
c1,i = af (h)w1,i −Di, i = 1, ..., N .
Here, qi is the (Arrow) price of a contingent claim that pays 1 if realization i takes place and
zero otherwise. For cases with complete markets, we follow the standard assumption of risk
neutral, arbitrage-free asset prices, i.e. qi = βpi.
Unrestricted optima. With complete markets, human capital investments hU (a) max-
imize the expected net present value of lifetime income by equating the marginal cost of
investing with the expected marginal return:
w¯1af
′ [hU (a)] = β−1,
where w¯1 ≡
∑N
i=1 piw1,i is the expected period 1 price of skill. Neither preferences nor initial
wealth W have an effect on investment, because there are no restrictions on asset/debt
holdings and there is full insurance. Asset/debt holdings Di are set to optimally smooth
consumption over time and across states: u′ (c0) = u′ (c1,i), for all i = 1, ..., N .
Limited Commitment with Complete Markets. To introduce limited commitment, assume
that individuals can default on their debts in the second period. Doing so, they attain a
‘default’ utility of V D (w1,i, a, h), which would generally be increasing in the realization
w1,i, ability a, and human capital investments h. The option to default gives raise to the
46Here, uncertainty in w1,i could also reflect uncertainty in ability; however we abstract from learning
about ability while in school as in Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (forthcoming).
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‘participation constraint’ u [w1,iaf (h)−Di] ≥ V D (w1i, a, h), which limits the credit and
insurance of borrowers.
Letting λi ≥ 0 denote the (discounted) multiplier on participation constraint i = 1, ..., N ,
optimal debt holdings satisfy u′ (c0) = (1 + λi) u′ (c1,i). For states w1,i in which the partici-
pation constraint does not bind (λi = 0), there is perfect consumption smoothing, c1,i = c0.
However, if either a is high and/or W is low, the participation constraint may bind for some
states, in which case we should observe positive consumption growth, c1,i > c0.
To explore the implications for human capital accumulation, we now focus exclusively on
the case in which a borrower who defaults is penalized by forfeiting a fraction κ˜ ∈ [0, 1] of
his earnings. This implies V D (w1i, a, h) = u [(1− κ˜)w1iaf (h)], so participation constraints
reduce to simple ‘solvency’ constraints of the form Di ≤ κ˜w1,iaf (h) for all i = 1, ..., N .
To ensure repayment, the debts carried into any state cannot exceed the income forfeiture.
Solvency constraints bind for high realizations of w1,i, in which case repayments equal Di =
κ˜w1iaf
′ (h). There is perfect smoothing across low earnings states but only limited insurance
in high earnings states.47 Optimal human capital investment hLC (a,W ) satisfies
w¯1af
′ [hLC (a,W )]
∑Ni=1 piw1,i
(
1+λiκ˜
1+λi
)
w¯1
 = β−1.
When all λi = 0, the unrestricted allocation is attained. Whenever at least one ‘sol-
vency’ constraint binds, investment is lower than the unrestricted level. This is because∑N
i=1 piw1,i
(
1+λiκ˜
1+λi
)
< w¯1 when 0 < κ˜ < 1 and λi > 0 for some i.
Other implications for investment are also similar to those discussed earlier in the model
of Section 6.1 with perfect certainty. For example, human capital investments help relax
solvency constraints in both models. This encourages investment and implies a ‘credit ex-
pansion’ response to education policies as discussed earlier. Furthermore, default does not
occur in equilibrium, since all debt repayments are contingent on future states. With such
rich contracts, optimal institutional arrangements would minimize the temptation of default
by raising κ˜ as high as possible (κ˜ = 1), in which case the economy attains the unconstrained
optimal allocation.
47Compared with a simple income-contingent repayment scheme in which individuals always repay a
constant fraction of their income, these allocations provide greater insurance in low income states.
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Limited commitment with incomplete markets. We now take the opposite extreme from
fully contingent contracts and assume that second period liabilities cannot depend on the
state, w1,i. Due to the incompleteness of contracts, default may now occur in equilibrium. We
assume that punishments for default take the same form of a proportional income forfeiture
κ˜w1,iaf (h), which is recovered by lenders.
Let D > 0 be the amount of debt individuals ‘promise’ to repay after school. Of course,
individuals will actually repay if and only if D ≤ κ˜w1,iaf (h). This defines the threshold for
w1,i, w˜1 (D, a, h) ≡ Dκ˜af(h) , below which an individual defaults. The probability of default,
Pr [w1,i < w˜1 (D, a, h)], is weakly increasing in the level of debt D and decreasing in ability
a and human capital h. In exchange for a promise to pay D > 0, risk-neutral lenders would
be willing to extend credit in an amount equal to
Q(D, a, h) = β
D − ∑
w1,i<w˜1
pi [D − κ˜w1,iaf (h)]
 .
From the full repaymentD, this expression subtracts the expected lossesD−κ˜w1,iaf (h) from
defaulting loans. Expected payments, Q (D, a, h), are not monotonically increasing in debt,
since increasing debt can more than proportionally reduce the probability of repayment.48
A ‘hard’ borrowing constraint is given by supD {Q (D, a, h)} < ∞, the maximum value a
lender could possibly expect to extract from someone with ability a investing h.
For simplicity, assume that w˜1 falls outside the support of w1,i and, therefore, ignore
jumps in the default probabilities.49 Under this assumption, marginal changes in D and h
do not affect the probability of default, and the necessary first order condition for D is
u′ (c0) = E[u′ (c1,i) |w1,i ≥ w˜1].
Optimal borrowing trades-off the gains in consumption c0 with the costs on future consump-
tion only in higher income states of the world in which there is repayment. The necessary
48As a function of D, only the increasing region of Q (·, a, h) is relevant.
49See Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011a) for a complete analysis of the general case.
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condition for optimal h is
w¯1af
′ (h)

N∑
i=1
piu
′ (c1,i)w1,i − κ˜
∑
w1,i<w˜1
piu
′ (c1,i)w1,i
w¯1u′ (c0) (1−Qh)
 = β−1,
where Qh > 0 is the partial derivative (subgradient) of Q with respect to h and must
be strictly less than 1 at the optimum.50 This equation reveals three important differences
between investment here and under full insurance. First, additional investment increases
expected payments, thereby expanding credit. This ‘credit expansion’ effect encourages
investment. Second, some benefits of investment are lost in the event of default since 0 <
κ˜ < 1. This new effect arises only because of default and discourages investment. Third,
the lack of insurance implies a precautionary motive for investment; however, the riskiness
of human capital can also reduce investments as discussed in Krebs (2003).
The absence of repayment contingencies has a number of important consequences. First,
default can occur in equilibrium. Second, if default happens, it is for low realizations of w1,i
when earnings and consumption are low. Third, the option to default serves an insurance
role: given the same liabilities D, the consumption of borrowers would be even lower if
they had to fully repay. As a result, eliminating default may be inefficient and could reduce
investment. The policy trade-offs in this model are more interesting than in previous models.
Interest rates, implicitly given by R(D, a, h) ≡ D/Q(D, a, h), contain a premium for the
possibility of default. Higher R(·) must cover for states in which borrowers default. Ability
directly impacts interest rates and credit limits, since Qa > 0; for the same investments h
and credit amount Q, more able individuals are asked to repay less. This effect would lead
more able persons to invest further in human capital (especially since Qah > 0). Of course,
higher investments in human capital would be coupled with higher liabilities, which has the
potential to increase the probability of default. Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011a) explore
the extent to which this type of model can reproduce observed default rates by ability, debt,
and post-school earnings.
Ionescu (2008, 2009, 2011) analyzes models similar to this in order to study college en-
rollment, borrowing, and default decisions when credit is provided by GSL programs. Her
50For a saver, D < 0 and Q(D, a, h) = βD. Thus, Qh = 0 and QD = β.
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results suggest that default rates are not higher among individuals that are most financially
constrained. Most interestingly, she considers the impact of repayment flexibility (e.g., lock-
in low interest rates, switching to income contingent repayments, or alternative bankruptcy
discharges) in calibrated versions of her models. Overall, she finds that the degree to which
contingencies can be incorporated into repayment schemes can have significant effects on
schooling. Her analysis suggests that more than hard borrowing constraints, the lack of in-
surance can sometimes be the limiting factor for schooling decisions. This general conclusion
is consistent with the quantitative analysis of Krebs (2003) as well as the structural estimates
of Johnson (2011) and Navarro (2010).
Private Information and Limited Insurance. The previous model with limited commit-
ment with incomplete (non-contingent) debt captures empirically interesting features of de-
fault and borrowing. However, conceptually, the lack of insurance assumed above is better
seen as arising from imperfect information. As such, it is natural to consider some of the
lessons and modeling approaches from the vast literature on optimal contracting under pri-
vate information.
First, consider ex-post asymmetric information. Lenders may not be able to offer income
contingent repayments if they cannot observe the ex-post circumstances of a borrower. Yet,
when outcomes can be observed at a cost, the possibility of partial insurance arises. In this
case, it is natural to adapt the model of costly state verification (Townsend 1979) to our
human capital setting. This framework is appealing because it both replicates important
features of actual bankruptcy institutions and of income contingent student loan programs.
If a cost must be incurred for lenders to observe the post-schooling earnings of a borrower,
the optimal contract is remarkably simple. For high realizations of w1,i, borrowers would
simply repay a fixed amount (avoiding any verification costs), while an audit would take place
for lower realizations. Observing the actual outcome (through verification), a risk-neutral
lender would provide a constant consumption level (i.e. full insurance) to the borrower in
‘low’ states of the world. Thus, the worst ex post outcomes would be fully insured against
(as opposed to partial insurance implicit in basic income-contingent loan programs.)
Given a uniform cost of verification, the fact that higher ability implies higher earnings
suggests that the probability of verification will be lower for more able individuals, while
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their consumption is likely to be higher when verification occurs. Higher family resources
would imply lower leverage and, hence, a lower probability of verification. These effects on
the terms of insurance would tend to produce more positive ability – investment and family
resources – investment relationships.
Next, consider moral hazard problems in investment. Suppose that in addition to ob-
servable investment h, young individuals must exert unobservable costly effort that affects
post-schooling earnings (with higher returns to effort for more able individuals) or the proba-
bility of graduation (as in Chatterjee and Ionescu (2010)). The well-known trade-off between
incentives and insurance suggests that some higher ability individuals may not obtain ade-
quate credit because lenders foresee (correctly) the toll of debt on effort incentives.
Finally, consider post-schooling moral hazard problems. Effort must be exerted to seek,
keep and improve one’s job after school is over. If these efforts are costly for the borrower and
unobserved by the creditor, a high debt may affect labor market outcomes as suggested by
the recent work of Braguinsky and Ohyama (2010). Foreseeing post-schooling moral hazard
problems, credit to human capital is likely to be reduced in the first place.
In the last two decades, an extensive literature on optimal unemployment insurance has
developed.51 This literature generally considers the welfare of workers once human capital
has been formed. Unfortunately, little is known about the joint design of optimal policies
that provide both access to credit for education and insurance against post-schooling labor
market risks when moral hazard is a problem.
7 Conclusions
Our review of the evidence suggests that, in recent years, credit constraints have become more
important for higher education decisions in the U.S. The significant rise in the costs of and
returns to college have increased the demand for credit well beyond the supply available from
government programs. As such, the rapid expansion in private lending over the past fifteen
years should not come as a surprise. Providing credit for human capital, however, requires
repayment enforceability and raises other incentive problems. As in Lochner and Monge-
51For instance, Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) and Shimer and Werning
(2008), among many others.
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Naranjo (2011b), we have argued that explicitly incorporating these incentive problems in
models of human capital formation can help explain observed cross-sectional patterns and
shed new light on schooling responses to policies and economic changes.
The importance of credit constraints extends beyond their impacts on college-going.
Distortions in student consumption and leisure have been documented even during periods
when college outcomes were not (e.g. the early 1980s). More importantly, recent evidence
highlights the adverse impacts family borrowing constraints can have on early investments in
children. There are good reasons to believe that these early constraints are more pervasive
and harmful than constraints at college ages. Recent work on the dynamic complementarity
in investments suggests that under-investment at early ages may explain why relaxing
constraints at later ages often has little impact. Instead, government policies targeting
younger ages can have much larger effects.
Credit constraints affect the degree of social mobility, the evolution of the income distribu-
tion, aggregate output and overall welfare. Quantitative macro studies have been successful
in replicating important cross-sectional and intergenerational patterns in the data. How-
ever, few fully incorporate dimensions of heterogeneity and the lifecycle, as emphasized in
the applied micro literature.
It is unfortunate that most of the human capital literature has ignored the vast literature
on optimal contracts with incentive constraints. We have shown how standard results in
this literature can be easily adapted to models of human capital formation, leading to new
insights on the way abilities and family resources affect investments in human capital and a
better understanding of how to best design government policies.
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8 Summary Points
• Evidence suggests that borrowing constraints have become more severe for college
attendance in recent years.
• In addition to college attendance, borrowing constraints affect consumption and work/leisure
while in school.
• Evidence suggests borrowing constraints may be more salient for family investments
in younger children than at college ages.
• Early borrowing constraints and complementarity between early and late investments
suggest that policies aimed at earlier ages offer more promise.
• Credit constraints shape the degree of social mobility, income distribution and overall
development and welfare of countries.
• Government student loan programs link borrowing to educational investments, while
private lenders offer credit based on future earnings, which depends on ability as well
as investments.
• The link between government and private credit and schooling generates a private
‘credit expansion effect’ which strengthens educational investment responses to many
education policies.
• Lack of insurance can be a major deterrent to human capital investments. Optimal
lending would provide insurance considering incentive problems arising from limited
observability and limited enforceability.
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9 Future Issues
• Additional work is needed to measure the extent to which early family credit constraints
inhibit early childhood investments and affect later educational outcomes and earnings.
• Future empirical studies are needed to better understand the skill production technol-
ogy, especially with respect to the dynamic complementarity of investments from birth
through early adulthood.
• Given improvements in computing power, additional margins of heterogeneity and re-
alistic life-cycle dynamics can be readily introduced in quantitative general equilibrium
models of human capital.
• To better understand cross-country differences in aggregate human capital, additional
work is needed to consistently measure differences in access to and prices of credit for
education.
• Additional empirical studies are needed to better understand the extent to which dif-
ferent individual characteristics and choices, as well as government policies, affect re-
payment of government and private student loans.
• Adapting well-known results from the optimal contracts literature to human capital
accumulation problems should lead to interesting insights about the impacts of ability
and family wealth on schooling as well as the optimal design of government lending
programs.
• Little is known about the impact of student debt on post-school labor market perfor-
mance. Future studies in this are can shed light on the importance of moral hazard in
the design of optimal student loan contracts.
• A promising avenue of research is integrating the optimal unemployment insurance
literature with the optimal design of credit programs for human capital accumulation.
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